Surely if you were born in '80 does not recognize this term, but we are more "oldies" have it built-in hard drive (of course, on a mainframe at that time).
For Chileans, come to recognize that He paid Moya was the collective way of acting out that external debt: we were in water up to his neck.
not that we did not know what he was getting obligations international bodies like the International Monetary Fund or World Bank. In this, our country had experienced. Already in the early years of the Republic Bernardo O'Higgins had to resort to external borrowing to finance state investment.
The problem was different. In the early '80s recession winds began to blow strong rises in international oil prices and a tough anti-inflation policy in major economies creditors. That significantly raise international interest rates, only one step. And hence, to generate a debt crisis in developing countries, a shorter one.
must remember the importance for the developing world debt and no wonder periodically these countries fall into the economic and financial inability to service debt and is to enter renegotiations.
The Chilean economy was no exception and was strongly affected. International prices of our major exports fell and foreign capital flows fell sharply, falling into one of the deepest recessions in its history. Between 1982 and 1983 GDP fell by almost 17%, unemployment rose to over 20%, about 800 bankrupt companies and private banks succumbed in one of its most acute crisis.
external debt amounted to five times and exceeded Chilean exports all that the country produced. With these amounts, debt service impossible!. There was no alternative: paying Moya!. But Moya was never charged. And we had to leave all alone with the head above water at the point of renegotiation.
debtor creditor do?
But that is history and today what has traditionally been a chronic problem for Latin American countries, may no longer be in Chile. As long as the current prosperity will last over time.
is interesting to note the significant improvement in external solvency ratios. So in 2005, total external debt reached U.S. $ 45,014 which represents 39% of GDP, which compares favorably with 45.8% in 2004 and 60.2% in 2002. Another index of solvency, the debt-export ratio also shows a positive development. While in 2002 this quotient was 1.8 times in 2005 dropped to 0.9 times. And finally the composition of debt: that last year only 21% were debt (owed by the state) and the remaining 79% private debt.
Thus, the exceptional income from the price of copper, reserves of the Central Bank and the Treasury greater resources we can change the face and while the U.S. begins to worry about its external debt in Chile we could stop being a debtor country to become a creditor country .
Who would have thought?. Neither Moya.
For Chileans, come to recognize that He paid Moya was the collective way of acting out that external debt: we were in water up to his neck.
not that we did not know what he was getting obligations international bodies like the International Monetary Fund or World Bank. In this, our country had experienced. Already in the early years of the Republic Bernardo O'Higgins had to resort to external borrowing to finance state investment.
The problem was different. In the early '80s recession winds began to blow strong rises in international oil prices and a tough anti-inflation policy in major economies creditors. That significantly raise international interest rates, only one step. And hence, to generate a debt crisis in developing countries, a shorter one.
must remember the importance for the developing world debt and no wonder periodically these countries fall into the economic and financial inability to service debt and is to enter renegotiations.
The Chilean economy was no exception and was strongly affected. International prices of our major exports fell and foreign capital flows fell sharply, falling into one of the deepest recessions in its history. Between 1982 and 1983 GDP fell by almost 17%, unemployment rose to over 20%, about 800 bankrupt companies and private banks succumbed in one of its most acute crisis.
external debt amounted to five times and exceeded Chilean exports all that the country produced. With these amounts, debt service impossible!. There was no alternative: paying Moya!. But Moya was never charged. And we had to leave all alone with the head above water at the point of renegotiation.
debtor creditor do?
But that is history and today what has traditionally been a chronic problem for Latin American countries, may no longer be in Chile. As long as the current prosperity will last over time.
is interesting to note the significant improvement in external solvency ratios. So in 2005, total external debt reached U.S. $ 45,014 which represents 39% of GDP, which compares favorably with 45.8% in 2004 and 60.2% in 2002. Another index of solvency, the debt-export ratio also shows a positive development. While in 2002 this quotient was 1.8 times in 2005 dropped to 0.9 times. And finally the composition of debt: that last year only 21% were debt (owed by the state) and the remaining 79% private debt.
Thus, the exceptional income from the price of copper, reserves of the Central Bank and the Treasury greater resources we can change the face and while the U.S. begins to worry about its external debt in Chile we could stop being a debtor country to become a creditor country .
Who would have thought?. Neither Moya.
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